Feb 27, 2006

OK, so I’ve done more reading on all of this, and I don’t often find myself in the position of disagreeing with people like Michelle Malkin (who I highly regard), though it has happened once or twice in the past.  Anyway, here are my current thoughts:

1. Saying that Dubai Ports World is out of the running simply because they are from an Arab country is a knee-jerk, stupid position - in fact, and I NEVER use this word as quickly as some, it is racist.  But, honestly, that isn’t what is being said by anyone who is saying anything intelligent.
2. Nearly a thousand US Naval ships are serviced every year by managed DPW ports.  We haven’t had a challenge with them there.
3. UAE is a needed ally in the war on terror.  They are one of the most cooperative nations in that region, and we have enjoyed a win-win relationship for years.  As to them being horrible people, remember that The UAE is one of the only countries in the region where non-Muslims can openly practice their religion - and has been this way for over 20 years.
4. That being said, there certainly is room for improvement - like condemning the radical Takfir doctrine as Jordan has.  Or, the fact that the cash required for the 9/11 attacks mostly made its way through the UAE banking system.  We will need continued, and indeed increased cooperation for these things to be fixed.  We better have a damn good reason for blocking them out of our industry.
5. DPW will have no responsibility for security.  The Coast Guard has that responsibility, and that isn’t going to change.  DPW will be required to cooperate with the CG, just as any other company would, and should.  There is some credence to the fact that any managing company officials will most likely be apprised of security measures and emergency procedures.
6. To the people who say that we should keep this kind of job here in the good-ol-USA - well 30% of the port terminals in the US are already controlled by foreign companies, so I don’t even take that as a serious argument.
7. In fact, from what I can tell, 24 of the top 25 port management companies are foreign based, which means that the OVERWHELMING MAJORITY of our incoming shipments are already managed by foreign interests just like DPW.  Since we only inspect 5% of our incoming shipments, we already trust these people quite a bit.  We leave a 95% open hole and we’re worried that somehow DPW will screw up our ability to look at the 5%, when it isn’t their responsibility to begin with?
8. The “Ties” to the Bush administration are weak and tenuous at best.  Treasury Secretary Snow was chairman of CSX Rail before joining the Bush cabinet - a year after he left CSX sold its international port interests to DPW.  Um, so what?  As I mentioned, there are only a few of these large companies in the world.  The fact that one sold something to another has nothing to do with anything. 

The most intelligent thing I’ve read about this to date is on the Counterterrorism Blog - we don’t necessarily come to the same conclusion, which concerns me.  They are the supposed experts and I’m not, so my tendency is to say that I’m ignorant and they are right.

Their most interesting point (found under the Administrative versus security section) outlines how the Jihadists would go about infiltrating DPW and how we would be put at risk as a result.

The deeper danger of penetration will be more complex: First, the enemy will penetrate from the UAE end, aided by Salafi or even Khumeinist sympathizers. This first line of defense could be breached by hiring elements to form a network inside the company, or subcontracted “hostile” entities in the future. Second, while moving inside the layers of the “management” the “net” could then hire elements coming from the American side. If we project that Jihadists are operating inside the US, a UAE company “managing” six main US ports would be a first rate opportunity for them to “connect.” Hence, one can project that once a “network” installs itself inside the corporation, it would be able to recruit US citizens and residents sympathizers with or part of the movement. A bridge would thus be established between the outside cells and the inside cells through a perfectly legitimate outlet.

Action would come once the bridge is operational. It could develop into multiple directions. General intelligence and spying in the US is only one possibility. Storing material in these sensitive areas is two. Learning about the security systems in these ports from the administrative end is three. Disrupting national security operations is four. The deeper the layers, the wider possibilities would open to the Jihadists. But the initial “hole” is what allows the chain to develop.

That is fairly terrifying to be sure, but they don’t go into detail about why this is more likely with the UAE than with other foreign companies.  They put it at the feet of Salafi and Khumeinist sympathizers - but these are not exactly unique to the UAE.

The fact is that we already outsource this type of work to foreigners and therefore the question becomes, is the UAE less trustworthy than any other country?  And, if they are, why do we already trust them with our military assets?

What really concerns me, whether it’s DPW or any other firm, is that there is no cohesive hiring or screening process for port workers whatsoever.  Now THAT should certainly change.  Also, I continue to be appalled at how little is actually inspected at our ports. Hong Kong inspects 100% of every shipment that hits their ports.  Why don’t we?

Port Security, Dubai Ports World, Portgate, Terrorism, UAE